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Abstract 
This paper reveals the underlying dynamics between capital buffer and performance for 
banks in EU-27. Dynamic panel analysis shows that capital buffer is significantly 
affected by bank performance, and also risk exposure. During the  financial crisis of 
2007 – 2008, we detect regime switches. We find positive relationship between capital 
buffer and bank performance for banks that fall in the low performance regime, while a 
negative relationship is reported for banks that belong to the high regime. Finally, 
threshold results show that capital buffer exerts a positive impact on bank stability for 
relatively better capitalized banks, while for relatively less capitalized banks increasing 
capital buffer reduces bank stability. These results provide evidence that although 
regulation reforms as regards capital requirements could improve bank performance and 
stability, these improvements are not homogeneous across banks. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 shows that sudden changes in asset quality and value 
can quickly diminish bank capital, leaving banks with inadequate capital to deal with 
unexpected losses. As a result, capital buffer requirements have become an instrument 
of providing cushion during adverse economic conditions and a macro-prudential tool 
preventing excessive risk-taking (Ayuso, Pérez, & Saurina, 2004; Jokipii & Milne, 
2008). Under Basel III (BCBS, 2010b) banks are required to maintain a mandatory 
capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent of common equity. In case of violation of the 
minimum requirement, restrictions on dividends and remunerations will be applied by 
Basel Committee. Furthermore, regulators may also require a discretionary 
countercyclical buffer up to another 2.5 percent of capital during periods of high credit 
growth. According to Basel Committee a rise in equity ratios lowers the probability of 
bank failures. From the perspective of banks, empirical evidence on the determinants of 
bank capital buffer suggests that banks may keep capital buffer in order to signal 
soundness to the markets and receive higher ratings from the rating agencies (Jackson 
et al., 1999). In addition, banks hold capital buffer to avoid costs related to penalties 
and restrictions that are imposed by the supervisors when the former violate minimum 
capital requirements (Buser, Chen, & Kane, 1981; Furfine, 2001; Jokipii & Milne, 
2011).  
Recent studies show that as raising capital through capital markets is costly especially 
during economic downturns, banks might rely on their own performance to build up 
capital buffers (Shim, 2013). The empirical results regarding the relationship between 
capital buffer and bank performance are inconclusive. There are studies that provide 
evidence for negative association between bank performance and capital buffer (Ayuso 
et al., 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008) suggesting that strong bank performance 
substitutes for capital as a cushion against unexpected losses. While, another strand of 
literature (Nier and Bauman, 2006; Shim, 2013) finds positive relationship between 
performance and capital buffer indicating that improvement in bank performance 
increases capital buffer. Apparently, the literature on the relationship between capital 
buffer and bank performance provides mixed results. To this end, in addition to the 
accounting ratios return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and net interest 
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margin (NIM), we employ bank cost efficiency derived by Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) as a measure of bank performance. 
Concerning the capital buffer and risk nexus, several empirical studies (Ediz, Michal, 
& Perraudin, 1998 ; Francis & Osborne, 2012; Jokipii & Milne, 2008; Rime, 2001; Shim, 
2013) have focused on the relationship between risk and bank capital buffer, testing 
whether increasing risks taken by banks force them to maintain higher capital buffer. 
The results show that there is a positive relationship between bank risk-taking and 
capital buffer, indicating that the riskier the bank the higher the capital buffer. Following 
previous literature (Ayuso et al., 2004; Jokipii & Milne, 2008), we employ non-
performing loans, off-balance-sheet items and net loans to account for bank risk 
exposure while as an additional measure of bank default risk, we include Z-Score. 
This paper contributes to the literature of the relationship between capital buffer, bank 
performance and risk in several ways. First of all, unlike previous studies this paper 
contributes to the existing literature by employing a dynamic panel threshold analysis 
in order to determine any switches in the relationships between capital buffer, bank 
performance and risk over the crisis years. This methodology allows data itself to define 
the crisis years indicating regime switches in the relationships between capital buffer 
and other bank-specific variables. Specifically, we investigate the presence of different 
regimes for the relationship between a) bank capital buffer and performance as 
measured by bank efficiency and b) bank capital buffer and risk of default as measured 
by Z-Score. Furthermore, we account for the inverse relationship between these 
variables. In particular, we examine the impact of capital buffer on bank performance 
and Z-Score by using capital buffer as a threshold variable.  Second, we opt for different 
measures of bank performance and risk so as to reveal all potential determinants of bank 
capital buffer. Finally, this study covers a period (2004 – 2013) that includes the crisis 
years and therefore we take into account any differences due to the financial meltdown 
in 2007 – 2008 and the recovery thereafter.   
Our results reveal significant relationships between bank capital buffer, performance 
and risk-taking. Specifically, results obtained by dynamic panel analysis show that bank 
performance and risk-taking have strong positive impact on capital buffer. In a further 
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analysis, dynamic threshold results indicate different regimes for the underlying 
relationships. Estimated results report positive relationship between bank capital buffer 
and performance for banks that fall in the low performance regime, while negative 
relationship between capital buffer and performance is reported for banks that belong 
in the high regime. Furthermore, threshold results show that capital buffer exerts strong 
negative impact on bank stability for relatively less capitalized banks, while the impact 
of capital buffer on bank stability is positive for relatively better capitalized banks.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets the hypotheses to be tested in the 
empirical section. Section 3 presents our data, whilst section 4 discusses our 
methodology. Next, section 5 shows regression results and the subsequent threshold 
analysis and finally, section 6 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses development 
2.1.The adjustment cost hypothesis. 
Following previous literature (Ayuso et al., 2004; Estrella, 2004; Guidara, Lai, Soumaré, 
& Tchana, 2013; Jokipii & Milne, 2008, 2011; Stolz & Wedow, 2011) we assume that 
banks need time to adjust their initial capital buffer towards their desired level. In the 
absence of adjustment costs in bank’s capital ratio, banks would not have incentives to 
hold capital in excess of the minimum regulatory requirements. Therefore, banks prefer 
to maintain a capital buffer as it is costly to fall below the minimum requirement 
(Fonseca & González, 2010; Jackson et al., 1999; Rime, 2001; Stolz & Wedow, 2011). 
Considering adjustments costs, we assume that banks take time to adjust their capital 
buffer towards the internal targets and thereby the capital buffer of the previous period 
should have positive and statistically significant impact on the current capital buffer. 
H1. Adjustment costs in bank capital would affect capital buffer.  
2.2. Bank performance hypothesis. 
Previous literature (Ayuso et al., 2004; Guidara et al., 2013; Jokipii & Milne, 2008; Nier 
& Baumann, 2006; Shim, 2013) uses ROE and ROA as bank performance measures 
and provides mixed results regarding the relationship between bank capital buffer and 
performance. In addition to the accounting ratios ROE, ROA and NIM, this study 
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employs bank cost efficiency derived from the SFA as an alternative measure of bank 
performance and a source of capital buffer.  
Although, there have been several studies about the link between total regulatory capital 
and efficiency, up till now the literature on the relationship between capital buffer and 
efficiency has been rather inconclusive. Specifically, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 
(2006) find negative relationship between regulatory capital and efficiency for U.S. 
banks over the period 1990 – 1995. Their results show that banks hold lower regulatory 
capital as higher efficiency eliminates the potential risk of default. In line with these 
results, Altunbas et al. (2007) using a sample of European banks, covering the period 
1992 – 2000, show that inefficient European banks tend to hold more capital and evolve 
in less risky activities. 
Another strand of the literature (Barth, Caprio Jr, & Levine, 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Laeven, & Levine, 2004; Pasiouras, 2008; Pasiouras, Tanna, & Zopounidis, 2009) 
suggests positive relationship between bank performance, as measured by efficiency 
and capital. However, this relationship does not appear to be significant always. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that higher capital requirements mitigate the probability 
of bankruptcy, enhancing bank efficiency (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999). Thus, further analysis is warranted so as to 
determine the relationship between capital buffer and bank performance. The second 
set of hypotheses is developed as follows: 
H2. Bank performance enhances bank capital buffer (and vis a versa) through regime 
switches. 
2.3.Bank risk-taking hypothesis 
During the last decades, regulators have emphasized the importance of capital 
requirements that financial institutions have to comply with in order to mitigate risk-
taking and enhance financial stability in the banking industry (BCBS, 2010b). The 
implementation of higher capital requirements aims to create a direct link between 
banks’ capital and risk. From the perspective of regulators, banks with higher risk 
should hold higher capital buffer. The reason is that banks that hold risky portfolios but 
do not maintain higher capital buffer are more likely to end up with capital below the 
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minimum requirement. A wide range of literature has focused on understanding the 
relationship between capital buffer and risk (Jackson et al., 1999; Jokipii & Milne, 2011; 
Lindquist, 2004; Rime, 2001; Shrieves & Dahl, 1992). Most of these studies have found 
positive relationship between bank capital buffer and risk, indicating that banks with 
risky positions hold higher capital buffer. Therefore, we test the following hypotheses: 
H4. Risk exerts positive impact on bank capital buffer (and vis a versa) through regime 
switches. 
3. Data and variables 
We use an unbalanced bank-level panel data that includes saving and commercial banks 
from EU-27 countries over the period 2004 – 2013 on annual basis.1 Our analysis uses 
1017 banks and a total of 3788 observations. The primary source of our data is the 
Bankscope database by Bureau van Dijk. Furthermore, we obtain macroeconomic data 
from the World Bank.  
3.1.Measuring bank capital buffer 
In line with previous studies (Ayuso et al., 2004; Fonseca & González, 2010; Guidara 
et al., 2013; Jokipii & Milne, 2008, 2011)), we define as capital buffer the amount of 
capital banks hold in excess of the minimum requirement. Table 1 includes the 
variability of total regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk Weighted Assets) 
across country and over time. Following Jokipii and Milne (2008), the calculation of 
minimum capital requirement for each country is based on Table 2 that presents the 
national total regulatory capital requirements. 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2]  
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for bank capital buffer across countries and over 
time. Data for the years 2004 – 2013 shows that banks hold far more capital than 
required by the regulators. Banks with the highest mean capital buffer are located in the 
 
1 In our sample we include both saving and commercial banks following the study of Casu and Girardone (2010). 
The authors suggest that mainly commercial and saving banks in European Union form depositary institutions and 
they have a sufficient degree of cross-country homogeneity and comparability. Previous studies that include both 
saving and commercial banks in their analysis are Maudos et al. (2002), Delis and Kouretas (2011), Gropp et al. 
(2010), Kalyvas and Mamatzakis (2014). In order to account for any differences in the business model between 
saving and commercial banks, most of these studies employ a dummy variable. In line with these studies, we also 
include a dummy variable for commercial banks (COM).    
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north Europe such as Belgium and Austria (15.35 and 14.59 respectively), while banks 
with the lowest capital buffer are in Germany (10.89), Croatia (10.92) and Sweden 
(10.98). The average capital buffer across EU-27 is 11.75. As regards the evolution of 
bank capital buffer over time, we should note that for the period 2004 – 2006 there is a 
negative trend. However, bank capital buffer shows a positive development for the 
period over 2007 – 2009. For the years 2010-2012 the decreasing capital buffer suggests 
that European banks had difficulties in maintaining high capital buffer due to the 
financial crisis (Avramidis and Pasiouras, 2015) while after 2012 bank capital buffer 
shows a recovery trend.  
[Insert Table 3]  
3.2.  Measuring bank cost efficiency. 
Bank efficiency has been widely used in previous research to examine the impact of 
managerial structure such as ownership and compensation on bank efficiency (Dong et 
al., 2016; Matousek and Tzeremes, 2016; Tzeremes, 2015; Staub et al., 2010; Fries and 
Taci, 2005), to investigate the effects of regulation on bank efficiency (Kalyvas & 
Mamatzakis, 2014; Jaffry et al., 2013; Berger et al., 2005; Bhattacharyya et al., 1997) 
while another strand of literature has examined the impact of systematic differences 
across banks, such as  size, on efficiency (Bos et al, 2009; Kwan, 2006; Isik and Hassan , 
2002; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In this paper, we derive bank performance from 
stochastic frontier analysis. This methodology combines the random error and 
efficiency in one composite error term (Berger & Humphrey, 1997).  The cost efficiency 
model for SFA is the following: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑍𝑘,𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                                                            (3a) 
Where 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 stands for the total cost of bank i at year t, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is a vector of inputs, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is a 
vector of outputs and 𝑁𝑖,𝑡  is a vector of quasi-fixed netputs while country-specific 
variables are represented by the vector 𝑍𝑘,𝑡. As regards 𝑣𝑖,𝑡, this term represents factors 
that affect the total cost function but are beyond the control of the managers. Finally 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 stands for the bank inefficiency that is controlled by managers and follows a half-
normal distribution. The cost efficiency scores lie between 0 and 1 and are calculated 
according to the below formula for each bank and each year: 
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 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = [exp(−𝑢𝑖,𝑡)] − 1 .                                                                                                 
(3b) 
To enhance flexibility, we resort to the translog cost specification: 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎0 +  ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖  
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗,𝑡𝑗 + 
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡𝑗 +𝑖𝑖𝑖
 ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗,𝑡𝑗 + 𝑖  ∑ 𝜁𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 +   
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡𝑗 + 𝑖𝑖   
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑖,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡𝑗 +𝑖
 ∑ ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑗,𝑡𝑗 +  𝜇1𝑇
2 +  ∑ 𝜈𝑖𝑇𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖 ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑇𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖 ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑇𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖  𝑖  ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝛧𝑘,𝑡 +𝑖
 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                            (4) 
Bank inputs and outputs are defined according to Sealey and Lindley (1977) based on 
the intermediation methodology. According to this methodology, the main purpose of 
banks is to use labour and capital to accumulate funds so as to transform them into loans 
and other income generating assets. We specify two inputs and two outputs. Specifically, 
inputs consist of labour as measured by the ratio of personnel expenses over total assets 
(P1) and financial capital measured as the ratio of total interest expenses over deposits 
and short term funding (P2). In terms of output prices, we include gross loans (Y1) and 
other earning assets (Y2) such as T-bills, bonds, government securities and equity 
investments. Total cost (TC) is defined as the sum of total interest and non-interest 
expenses. 
Finally, we include as quasi-fixed netput the fixed assets of each bank (N1) as a proxy 
for physical capital as it is used from Berger and Mester  (1997). Furthermore, we 
include equity (N2) as a second qausi- fixed netput as equity represents alternative 
source of funding for banks and therefore, equity might affect the cost structure of banks 
(Berger & Mester, 1997; Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, & Molyneux, 2011).  
Furthermore, the translog function includes the time trend (T) to account for 
technological progresses and any potential time effects (Bonin, Hasan, & Wachtel, 2005; 
Gaganis & Pasiouras, 2013). Finally, we include country-specific dummy variable (𝑍𝑘,𝑡), 
in order to capture country characteristics and cross country differences (Bonin et al., 
2005; Gaganis & Pasiouras, 2013). 
The variability in bank cost efficiency across country and over time is reported in Table 
4. Table 4 shows that the average cost efficiency for the sample is around 78%. This 
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indicates that banks need to improve their efficiency by 22% in order to converge to the 
cost efficiency frontier. At a country level, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have the 
lowest cost efficiency scores with scores of 0.63, 0.63 and 0.64 respectively whereas 
banks in Malta, Spain and Sweden are the best performers with efficiency scores around 
0.85, 0.84 and 0.83 respectively. These efficiency scores are in line with previous 
literature (Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, & Song, 2013; Casu & Girardone, 2010; Hasan, 
Koetter, & Wedow, 2009; Kalyvas & Mamatzakis, 2014; Pasiouras, Hasan, Wang, & 
Zhou, 2009). 
Concerning the evolution of bank efficiency over time, one can notice that there is an 
apparent reduction in cost efficiency during the years 2006 – 2008 with the lowest score 
in 2008 (0.73). The next two years are characterized by a positive trend (0.79 in 2009 
to 0.81 in 2010). After the year 2010, bank cost efficiency decreases possibly because 
most of the European banks are exposed to the sovereign debt crisis.  
[Insert Table 4] 
Regarding the accounting bank performance measures, we include ROE which is the 
return to shareholders on their equity. Our next measure of bank performance is the 
ROA which reflects the ability of managers to generate profits using banks assets 
indicating how efficient bank assets are managed. Finally, we employ NIM which 
focuses on the profits earned from interest activities.  
3.3. Measuring bank risk exposure 
Concerning bank risk exposure, we employ various measures of risk. We include the 
ratio of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL). We expect NPL to have positive 
impact on bank capital buffer. Banks with increasing NPL will increase their capital 
buffers, as they are obligated to hold higher levels of loan loss provisions (Jokipii & 
Milne, 2008).  
We include the ratio of Off-Balance-Sheet items over total liabilities (OBS) as another 
measure for bank risk. OBS items are measured as the non-interest income and fee 
generating from various contingent liabilities such as derivatives, letters of credit, 
insurance and other types of non-traditional banking activities and securities 
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underwriting. OBS items increase the risk that bank is exposed to and therefore, we 
expect that banks with higher amount of OBS items will hold higher capital buffer in 
order to deal with the higher risk exposure. Furthermore, banks with large loan portfolio 
are exposed to higher risk especially during economic recession. Therefore, we include 
the ratio of bank loans over total assets (NETLOANS) as an additional risk measure. 
As banks with increasing loan portfolio have higher exposure to risk, we expect a 
positive coefficient for NETLOANS (Jokipii & Milne, 2008). Moreover, we employ the 
Z-Score as proposed by Boyd and Graham (1986). Z-Score is measured according to 
the following formula: Z-Score = (1 + ROE) / Standard Deviation of ROE and indicates 
the risk of failure for a given bank. Higher the values of Z-Score, lower the probability 
of failure. This measure of default risk has been widely used in the literature (Barry, 
Lepetit, & Tarazi, 2011; Lepetit, Nys, Rous, & Tarazi, 2008; Radić, Fiordelisi, & 
Girardone, 2012).  
3.4. Other control variables 
As a measure for market discipline, we include a dummy variable DISCLSR that takes 
the value 1 for listed banks and 0 for unlisted indicating information disclosures. We 
expect that the observability of bank’s risk choices, as captured by this dummy variable, 
will increase the incentive of banks to hold regulatory capital above the minimum 
requirement in order to reduce the risk of default and avoid being penalised by investors 
for choosing higher risk (Boot & Schmeits, 2000; Nier & Baumann, 2006). 
We also include the explanatory variable SIZE to detect differences in the level of 
capital buffer according to bank size. Size may have an impact on capital buffer due to 
the extent of bank diversification, funding and investment opportunities. The natural 
log of total assets is used as a measure of bank size and the relationship could be positive 
or negative depending on how small and large banks adjust their capital buffers during 
the period under study. Size may have negative impact on capital buffer, as large and 
well diversified banks have much smaller probability of suffering from sharp decline in 
their capital ratios, while in line with previous studies(Ayuso et al., 2004; Berger, 
DeYoung, Flannery, Lee, & Oeztekin, 2008; Bikker & Metzemakers, 2004; Francis & 
Osborne, 2012; Jokipii & Milne, 2008; Rime, 2001; Shrieves & Dahl, 1992), we expect 
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that smaller banks will increase their capital buffers in order to deal with their 
weaknesses in capital markets  . 
Moreover, we account for the concentration ratio (C5) in the banking industry by 
including the sum of the assets of the five largest banks as a share of all banks in each 
country and for each year. The impact of the concentration ratio on capital buffer could 
be positive or negative. The sign depends on whether low competition will increase or 
decrease the incentives for higher capital (Nicoló, Bartholomew, Zaman, & Zephirin, 
2004; S. Mishkin, 1999).   
Furthermore, in order to eliminate the potential biases associated with having omitted 
variables, we employ a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for European Monetary 
Union countries and 0 otherwise (EMU). In addition, we include time dummies to 
capture any potential time effects and a dummy variable  for commercial banks (COM) 
in order to account for any differences between commercial and saving banks (Casu & 
Girardone, 2010). Table 5 identifies the variables and provides brief descriptions of the 
data sources, while Table 6 includes summary statistics for the key variables.  
[Insert Table 5 and Table 6] 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Dynamic Panel Model 
Following previous studies (Ayuso et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2008; Estrella, 2004; 
Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Jokipii & Milne, 2008; Rime, 2001), we employ partial 
adjustment process in order to examine the convergence of bank’s initial capital buffer 
toward its target within each time period.  
Therefore, the change in the capital buffer is specified as follows: 
𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 =   𝜆 (𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹
∗
𝑖,𝑡
− 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                            
(1a) 
Here, 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 is the observed change in capital buffer as defined by bank 
i at year t. BUFF𝑖,𝑡 ( BUFF
∗
𝑖,𝑡) is the actual (target) capital buffer of bank i in time t,  𝜆 
is the speed of adjustment while 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
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Each year bank’s actual buffer (BUFF𝑖,𝑡) converges to its desired level (BUFF𝑖,𝑡
∗ ) by a 
proportion λ. Low estimated values of  λ indicate that banks are passive managers of 
their capital buffer, while high values of  λ  indicate that banks actively manage their 
buffer toward their target level (Berger et al., 2008).  
As suggested by the banking literature (Ayuso et al., 2004; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; 
Jokipii & Milne, 2008), the target capital buffer  (𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹∗
𝑖,𝑡
) is not easily observable, 
but could be modelled using the bank-specific variables discussed in the data section. 
Therefore, target capital buffer is approximated as follows: 
𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                     
(1b) 
Substituting Eq. (1b) into Eq. (1a) we end up with the following equation:                                                                 
𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜆𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                                                                         
(2) 
By adding  𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑡−1 to both sides of Eq. (2), we specify our empirical model as follows: 
𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + (1 − 𝜆)𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                            
(3)                                                                   
Where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  is a vector of bank-specific variables. The lagged value of the dependent 
variable (𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1) captures the importance of adjustment costs and we expect a 
positive and significant coefficient for this variable as stated in our first hypothesis. The 
error term 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  consists of a bank-specific component  𝜇𝑖 , which is assumed to be 
constant over time and a white noise 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Hence, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where 𝜇𝑖 ~ iid (o,σμ2) 
and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ~ iid (o,σε2). 2 
We estimate of Eq. (3) by employing  the two-step system generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator as developed by Arellano and Bover (1995).3 Furthermore, 
 
2 Since BUFFi,t is a function of μi, BUFFi,t−1 is also a function of μi and therefore the right hand regressor in Eq. (3) 
is correlated with the error term. As a result, the OLS estimator will be biased and inconsistent. Furthermore, although 
the fixed effect estimator eliminates 𝜇𝑖, “Nickell bias” exists as T is relatively small compared to N meaning few 
time periods and many individuals (Nickell, 1981).  
3 This methodology is preferred for three main reasons. First, by taking first differences for all variables, we eliminate 
the presence of unobserved bank-specific effects. Second, we use the lagged dependent variable to capture the 
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we follow Roodman (2009) accounting  for Windmeijer (2005) biased-corrected robust 
standard errors.  
4.2.  Dynamic panel threshold model  
Given the financial crisis of 2007 - 2008, we opt for a novel methodology that enables 
us to identify any potential regime changes in the relationship between capital buffer, 
bank performance and risk-taking. We follow the estimation methodology developed 
by Hansen (1999) and Kremer et al. (2013). Threshold methodology uses the cross 
sectional model employed by Caner and Hansen (2004), where the authors allow for 
endogeneity by using GMM estimators. Kremer et al. (2013) extended this methodology 
to a dynamic unbalanced threshold methodology that identifies possible changes in the 
coefficient of the independent variables. 
We employed the following threshold model: 
𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆1𝑚𝑖,𝑡 𝐼(𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝛿1𝐼(𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝛾) + 𝜆2𝑚𝑖,𝑡𝐼 (𝑋𝑖,𝑡 > 𝛾) +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡              
(4) 
The subscript i refers to the individual banks and the subscript t indexes the time. 
𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the dependent variable, 𝜇𝑖 is the bank-specific fixed effect and 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 the 
reverse regression slopes and based on these slopes we assume two regimes. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the 
threshold variable and  𝛾 is the threshold value, which distribute the observations above 
and below the threshold value composing the high and low regimes respectively. 𝐼 is 
the indicator function that specifies the two regimes as defined by the threshold variable. 
Finally, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the error term, which is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed (iid) with mean zero and finite variance σ2. The model employed by Kremer 
et al. (2013) treats 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 as a vector of explanatory variables that includes a subset 𝑚1𝑖,𝑡 
of exogenous variables uncorrelated with 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  and a subset 𝑚2𝑖,𝑡  of endogenous 
variables correlated with 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. Furthermore, Kremer et al. (2013) extend Hansen’s (1999) 
 
dynamic nature of capital buffer and third, by using GMM methodology, we account for potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. We consider as exogenous the country-specific variables and time dummies and as 
endogenous the bank-specific variables (Ayuso et al., 2004; Fonseca and González, 2010). The instruments chosen 
for the lagged endogenous variables are two-to-six period lags of the same variables. Finally, the results of the two-
step system GMM estimator are tested by the Hansen’s J diagnostic test for instrument validity and the test for the 
second-order autocorrelation of the error terms suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
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work by accounting for the regime dependent variable 𝛿1  which represents the 
differences in the regime intercepts. According to Bick (2010), we include 𝛿1 as 
disregarding the regime intercepts would lead to biased estimates for both the regime 
coefficients and the threshold value.  
In the first step, in order to estimate the predicted values, Kremer et al. (2013) following 
Caner and Hansen (2004) used the reduced form of regressions for the endogenous 
variable as a function of instruments. In step two, the threshold value γ is estimated by 
using the predicted values of the endogenous variables in Eq. (4). In the third step, in 
order to obtain the slope parameters 𝜆1 and 𝜆2, Eq. (4) is estimated via GMM for the 
threshold value γ, where the threshold variable is replaced by its predicted values 
calculated in the second step.  According to Caner and Hansen (2004), the optimal 
threshold is estimated via a minimizer of the sum of squared errors by using 2SLS 
estimator.  Following Caner and Hansen (2004) and Hansen (1999), the 95% confidence 
interval of the threshold value is given by the Γ = [γ: LR(γ) ≤ C(α)]. Here, C(α) indicates 
the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic at 95% significance level.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1.Panel regression  results 
Dynamic Panel results are presented Table 7 and Table 8. In Table 7 we use the cost 
efficiency as the performance measure. We add control variables gradually in order to 
see the individual impact of the main variables. Model (3) includes NPL as the main 
measure of bank risk, while in Model (4) we use Z-Score as risk measure. Finally, 
Model (5) accounts for all bank and country-specific variables simultaneously. The cost 
of adjustment captured by the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
positive and highly significant in all specifications. These results confirm hypothesis 
H1 suggesting that banks take time to adjust current capital buffer towards their internal 
targets. The coefficients of  𝐵𝑈𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1  changes across different models when we 
include other control variables. Adding all bank and country-specific variables in Model 
(5), the speed of adjustment (1 – λ), increases from 0.188 in Model (1) to 0.533 in Model 
(5). The speed of adjustment of 0.533 in Model (5) indicates that when we account for 
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other determinants of bank capital buffer simultaneously, banks converge to their target 
capital buffers with a rate of 53.3% per annum.  
In terms of regression estimates, the coefficient of cost efficiency (EFF) is positive and 
significant at 1% level (see Models (3) and (4)). In Model (5) which includes all control 
variables, EFF exerts positive impact on bank capital buffer at 5% level. These results 
are in line with our second hypothesis H2 indicating that efficient banks hold higher 
capital buffer possibly because efficient banks are more profitable and therefore 
accumulate more capital (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Furthermore, this positive relationship 
between bank efficiency and capital buffer could be explained by the charter value 
theory according to which due to the income effect of high cost efficiency, banks keep 
higher capital to protect their reputation and charter value (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 
2006).  
As regards the impact of non-performing loans (NPL) on bank capital buffer, Model (5) 
indicates that NPL exerts positive impact on buffer at 1% level. This finding is in line 
with our expectations, as NPL reflects bank’s asset quality and risk exposure. Therefore, 
higher level of NPL indicates lower asset quality and hence higher risk. As a 
consequence, banks with higher NPL increase their capital buffer in order to comply 
with minimum regulatory requirements and alleviate their solvency risk. These results 
confirm our hypothesis H4 and are in line with Ediz et al. (1998 ), Fonseca and González  
(2010) and Jokipii and Milne (2011). 
While the positive sign of NPL suggests that riskier banks hold higher buffers, when we 
account for bank risk exposure by using the Z-Score as a measure of the distance from 
default, the findings reveal different relationship. The impact of Z-Score on bank capital 
buffer is positive and significant at 5% level in Model (5) suggesting that stable banks 
with low risk of default accumulate higher capital buffers. These findings reject 
hypothesis H4 and are in line with the charter value theory.4 Stable banks with lower 
risk of default have higher charter value (Anderson & Fraser, 2000; Cordella & Yeyati, 
 
4 Charter value of a bank is defined as the value that would be foregone due to a bankruptcy. According to this theory 
there is ambiguous relationship between bank capital and risk taking. From the one hand, higher risk can increase 
the probability of default and therefore encourage banks to raise their capital. While from the other hand, higher risk 
can dump bank’s charter value and hence reduce bank capital.  This has been broadly discussed by (Boot & Schmeits, 
2000; Hellmann, Murdock, & Stiglitz, 2000). 
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2003; Jokipii & Milne, 2011; Keeley, 1990) and therefore banks with high Z-Score will 
sustain their value by holding higher capital buffers.  
The OBS items have positive impact on bank capital buffer at 10% level in Model (5), 
indicating that banks with large off-balance sheet activities prefer to hold higher capital 
buffer as a cushion against unexpected losses. Moreover, NETLOANS have positive 
impact on capital buffer at 5% level in Models (4) – (5). These results suggest that 
increasing loan portfolio exposes banks to higher risk and as a result riskier banks hold 
higher capital buffer (Jokipii & Milne, 2008).  Furthermore, the 10% significant 
coefficient of the dummy variable DISCLSR in Model (5) indicates that due to the 
information disclosure listed banks might account for market discipline and hold higher 
capital buffer as a sign of solvency to markets.  
Regarding the impact of bank size on capital buffer, our findings are contrary to 
previous literature. Most of the existing literature claim that bank size has negative 
impact on capital buffer as larger banks have more benefits from diversification and 
easier access to capital markets (Fonseca & González, 2010; Guidara et al., 2013; 
Jokipii & Milne, 2008; Lindquist, 2004; Rime, 2001; Stolz & Wedow, 2011). Given 
that larger institutions have easier access to capital markets, they will try to protect their 
reputation and ensure their capital adequacy by holding higher capital buffers.  
All models pass the Hansen standard validity tests of the instruments used in the 
regressions. Moreover, AR(2) p-values show that there is no second-order correlation 
in the error terms, as should be if the residuals in levels are white noise. 
[Insert Table 7] 
In a further analysis, we use dynamic panel regressions to examine the relationship 
between bank capital buffer and alternative measures of bank performance as used in 
previous literature. Model (1) in Table 8 employs bank efficiency scores as performance 
measure, Model (2) uses the ROE as an indicator of bank performance, Model (3) 
examines the relationship between capital buffer and ROA while in Model (4) we 
include NIM, In Models (5) - (7) we analyse the simultaneous impact of the efficiency 
and one of the other performance measures on bank capital buffer.  
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In contrast with Ayuso et al (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2008), results obtained from 
Model (2) indicate positive relationship between ROE and capital buffer at 1% level. 
These results are  in line with Nier and Baumann (2006)  who suggest that an increase 
in ROE increases capital buffer. As regards the impact of the other control variables on 
capital buffer, results show that when we use ROE as performance measure, NPL, Z-
Score, OBS and NETLOANS maintain their positive impact on bank capital buffer. The 
significant coefficient of bank size indicates that even when we account for bank 
performance with ROE, increasing size leads to higher capital buffer. Finally, in Model 
(3) we use ROA as a determinant of bank performance while in Model (4) we employ 
NIM. Results suggest that both variables have positive but insignificant impact on 
capital buffer.  
Next, Models (5) – (6) show the impact of bank efficiency on capital buffer when we 
include additional measures of bank performance. Specifically, in Model (5) we employ 
both EFF and ROE in our regression. Results suggest that even when we account for 
ROE, bank efficiency exerts positive impact on capital buffer at 5% level. Regarding 
the impact of the other variables, one can note that in Model (5) the sign and the 
significance of most control variables are identical with those obtained from our main 
regression in Model (1) indicating that the inclusion of ROE as performance measure 
does not affect our regression results. 
In models (6) and (7), we include EFF with ROA and NIM respectively. Both 
regressions suggest that while ROA and NIM are insignificant, bank efficiency 
maintains its positive impact on capital buffer at 5% in models (6) and 1% in Model (7) 
respectively. Concerning the impact of the other variables in Model (6) and (7), NPL 
exerts positive impact on capital buffer at 1% and 10% respectively. The coefficients of 
Z-Score and NETLOANS are positive and significant when we include ROA, while 
SIZE maintains its positive impact on bank capital buffer in all specifications at 1% 
level.  
[Insert Table 8] 
5.2.Threshold estimations  
5.2.1. The Capital Buffer – Efficiency nexus  
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Our sample for threshold estimation consists from 1735 observations for 314 banks for 
the period 2005-2013. The results for the empirical relationship between bank capital 
buffer and efficiency are presented in Table 9. We find a threshold variable of 0.818 for 
bank efficiency. This threshold value splits our sample into two regimes. The low 
regime includes 1033 banks with efficiency scores less than 0.818. The estimated 
coefficient 𝜆1 indicates that for banks that fall in the low efficiency regime, efficiency 
exerts positive impact on bank capital buffer at 1% level. This result suggests that for 
relatively less efficient banks, an increase in efficiency, increases bank capital buffer. 
The high regime consists from 702 banks with efficiency scores greater than the 
threshold value. The negative sign of the estimated coefficient 𝜆2  indicates that for 
banks in the high regime, efficiency has negative impact on bank capital buffer at 5% 
level. 
A striking result of this analysis is that the relationship between capital buffer and bank 
efficiency is characterized by structural breakpoint indicating that the impact of 
efficiency on capital buffer depends on the level of bank’s efficiency. The positive 
coefficient for banks that fall in the low regime suggests that relatively less efficient 
banks use their increasing efficiency to accumulate higher capital buffers. This finding 
confirms hypothesis H2 and is in line with the charter value theory according to which 
more efficient banks hold higher capital in order to protect their future income derived 
from high efficiency (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Keeley, 1990). Conversely, 
the negative coefficient for relatively more efficient banks is at odds with hypothesis 
H2 suggesting that higher efficiency might substitutes for capital as a buffer against 
unexpected losses. This finding could be compared with Jokipii and Milne  (2008) and 
Ayuso et al. (2004) who find negative relationship between bank performance and 
capital buffer.  
As regards the other bank specific variables, we find that in line with the results of the 
dynamic panel regressions in Table 8, the coefficient of the lagged value of capital 
buffer (Lag Buffer) is positive at 1% level, confirming hypothesis H1. Furthermore, Z-
Score, Net Loans and Size have positive impact on bank capital buffer at 1% level. The 
positive coefficient of Z-Score shows that stable banks with low risk of default 
accumulate higher capital buffers. These findings are in line with the dynamic panel 
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regressions in Table 8. The positive impact of net loans on capital buffer suggests that 
banks with large loan portfolios hold higher capital buffer as a cushion against 
unexpected risks. Finally, the positive impact of bank size on capital buffer might be 
due to the fact that as larger banks have easier access to capital markets, they prefer to 
hold higher capital buffers as a sign of solvency to markets.  
 [Insert Table 9] 
Moreover, in Table 10 we consider the evolution of banks in low and high regimes for 
the period 2005 –2013. One can notice a negative trend in the percentage of banks with 
relatively high efficiency scores for the years 2006 - 2008 (68% in 2006 decreases to 
27% in 2007 and in 15% in 2008). Although, for the years 2009 – 2010 there is a 
significant recovery in the number of banks that fall in the high efficiency regime (from 
15% in 2008 to 54% in 2009 and 57% in 2010), the trend in the following years is 
negative. These results are supported by the impact of the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 
on the banking sector. The reduction in the number of banks with efficiency above the 
threshold value, mirrors the deteriorating performance of banks during the crisis. 
[Insert Table 10] 
In a further analysis we account for the impact of capital buffer on bank efficiency. 
Therefore, we employ the threshold methodology using the capital buffer as a threshold 
variable and the bank efficiency as dependent variable. The impact of capital buffer on 
efficiency is presented in Table 11. The estimated capital buffer threshold is 13.594. 
The low regime consists of 1273 banks with relatively low capital buffer while the high 
regime consists of 462 banks. The coefficient 𝜆1  for banks in the low regime is 
significant at 10% level. This result is consistent with hypothesis H3, according to 
which an increase in the amount of capital buffer enhances bank performance. Our 
findings could be compared with those of Fiordelisi et al. (2011) and Pasiouras et al. 
(2009) who find that increasing bank capital leads to efficiency improvements.  
As regards the impact of bank specific variables on bank efficiency, our results show 
that the lagged value of efficiency (Lag Efficiency) exerts positive impact on efficiency 
at 1% level, suggesting persistence in bank performance. The negative coefficient for 
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non-performing loans at 1% level indicates that higher risk exposure harms banks’ 
efficiency. These results are in line with previous findings about the negative 
relationship between bank risk exposure and efficiency (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Fries & 
Taci, 2005; Goddard, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2004; Mamatzakis & Bermpei, 2014). In 
addition, the negative impact of net loans on efficiency shows that larger loan portfolios 
decrease bank efficiency. This negative relationship might be due to the less credit 
monitoring from banks that expand their loan portfolios (Kwan et al., 1997).  
The impact of bank size on efficiency is negative implying that bank efficiency 
decreases as bank size increases. This results are in line with Kwan ( 2006) and Isik and 
Hassan (2002)  who suggest negative relationship between bank size and efficiency.  
Furthermore, Leightner and Lovell (1998), Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and  Pasiouras 
and Kosmidou (2007) find that size is negatively correlated with efficiency for both 
domestic and foreign banks due to agency costs, bureaucratic processes and other costs 
relating to managing extremely large institutions.  
[Insert Table 11] 
The evolution of banks in the low and high regimes over the sample period is presented 
in Table 12. It is obvious that the percentage of banks classified in low regime is 
consistently above the percentage of banks in the high regime. Table 12 shows negative 
trend in the percentage of banks with high capital buffer for the years 2006 – 2008 (27% 
in 2006 to 21% in 2007 and 23% in 2008), while after 2009 there is a recovery in the 
percentage of banks in the high regime. These results could be explained by the high 
cost of raising capital during distress (Campbell, 1979). Thus, our findings show that 
banks’ ability to accumulate regulatory capital over the minimum requirement has 
deteriorated due to the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008.  
[Insert Table 12] 
5.2.2. Capital Buffer - Z-Score nexus 
We further examine the relationship between bank capital buffer and risk of default as 
measured by the Z-Score. High values of Z-Score indicate more stable banks with lower 
risk of default.  Table 13 presents threshold estimation results using capital buffer as 
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dependent variable and Z-Score as threshold regime variable. The threshold value for 
the Z-Score is 0.881. This value splits our sample into the low regime which consists of 
banks with relatively high risk of default and the high regime consisting from more 
stable banks. The coefficient 𝜆1  is positive and significant at 1% level for banks that 
fall in the low regime while the impact of Z-Score on capital buffer is insignificant for 
banks in the high regime. These results contradict with our hypothesis H4 and are in 
line with those obtained by the dynamic panel regressions in Table 8 indicating that for 
banks with relatively low Z-Score and therefore high risk of default an increase in Z-
Score increases capital buffer.    
As Regards the impact of the other bank specific variables on capital buffer, the 
estimated results in Table 13 are in line with those of Table 9 where the threshold 
variable was the efficiency. The lagged value of bank capital buffer, efficiency, net 
loans and bank size exert positive impact on capital buffer at 1% significance level.  
[Insert Table 13] 
Concerning the evolution of the banks in low and high regime over time, Table 14 shows 
that the percentage of banks in high regime is above the percentage of banks in the low 
regime for the years between 2005 – 2008 and 2011. Apparently, there is a decreasing 
trend in the number of banks in the high regime with relatively low risk of default after 
2007 with the lowest value of 46% in 2012 and 2013.  
[Insert Table 14] 
In order to examine the impact of capital buffer on bank stability, we employ the 
threshold methodology using Z-Score as the dependent variable and capital buffer as 
the threshold regime variable. Table 15 presents the estimated results. The threshold 
value of capital buffer is 11.274 and splits our sample in low regime that consists of 
banks with relatively low capital buffers and the high regime with banks holding 
relatively higher capital buffers. Both regime-dependent coefficients of capital buffer 
are significant at 1% level but of different sign. The low regime has negative 
coefficient 𝜆1, indicating that for banks with relatively low capital buffer an increase in 
capital buffer, decreases the Z-Score and therefore increases the risk of default 
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providing evidence in favour of H5. These findings are in line with previous literature 
(Delis, Hasan, & Tsionas, 2014; Shrieves & Dahl, 1992) who state that banks increase 
their capital level by increasing their risk exposure. 
Conversely, the positive coefficient 𝜆2 for banks that belong in the high regime with 
relatively high capital buffers shows that an increase in capital buffer increases Z-Score 
and therefore decreases the risk of default. These results are at odds with hypothesis H5 
and in line with previous studies (Duran & Lozano-Vivas, 2014, 2015; Guidara et al., 
2013; Jacques & Nigro, 1997), who support that the implementation of minimum capital 
requirements by Basel Committee, has succeed in its main aim of reducing the risk 
taking by banks. According to these studies, the larger the capital buffer, the weaker the 
incentives of banks to engage in risky activities as banks increase their capital buffers 
due to the introduction of risk-based capital standards. 
[Insert Table 15] 
Furthermore, as regards the impact of other control variables on Z-Score, we find that 
non-performing loans decrease bank stability and hence increase the risk of default. In 
addition, efficiency exerts positive impact on Z-Score at 1% level, indicating that an 
increase in the efficiency enhances bank stability. Moreover, the positive coefficient of 
GDP growth indicates that during periods of increasing GDP growth, banks operate in 
a more favourable environment by making higher profits and as a result they are more 
stable with low risk of default (Albertazzi & Gambacorta, 2009; Bolt, de Haan, 
Hoeberichts, van Oordt, & Swank, 2012; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011; Williams, 
2003). 
Finally, Table 16 shows that the percentage of banks with relatively high capital buffer 
decreases for the years 2006 – 2007 with the highest reduction in 2007 (55% in 2005 to 
47% in 2007). This might be due to the costly capital during the crisis of 2007 - 2008 
that renders difficult for banks to increase their regulatory capital, while in 2013 there 
is a recovery in the number of banks that hold capital buffer above the threshold value 
(61% in 2013).   
[Insert Table 16] 
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6. Conclusion 
This study empirically addresses the association between bank capital buffer, 
performance and risk-taking. Using a sample of EU-27 banks over the period 2004 – 
2013, the findings of this study could be of interest to both supervisory authorities and 
bank managers. Given that our sample covers the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008, we 
employ the dynamic panel threshold methodology as developed by Kremer et al. (2013). 
Results show different regimes over the sample period. Strong positive impact of bank 
performance on capital buffer is reported for banks in the low performance regime, 
while for relatively better performing banks improvement in performance decreases 
capital buffer. Moreover, threshold estimation results indicate positive impact of capital 
buffer on bank performance in the low capital buffer regime. These findings provide 
evidence that the regulatory framework as regards the capital adequacy requirements 
can enhance bank performance. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests regime changes for the relationship between 
capital buffer and bank stability as measured by Z-Score. Threshold results show that 
capital buffer exerts strong negative impact on bank stability for banks that fall in the 
low capital buffer regime. Conversely, the impact of capital buffer on bank stability is 
positive for banks in the high capital buffer regime. The positive relationship between 
capital buffer and Z-Score for the high regime banks suggests that the implementation 
of minimum capital requirements by Basel Committee might have succeed in its main 
aim of creating a more stable banking system by reducing bank default risk for relatively 
better capitalized banks. However, the negative impact of capital buffer on Z-Score for 
banks that fall in the low regime indicates that the minimum capital requirements might 
have undermined bank stability by increasing the risk-taking incentives for relatively 
less capitalized banks. 
Notably, we find changes in the percentage of banks in each threshold regime during 
and after the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008. More specifically, there is an increasing 
trend in the percentage of banks in the low performance regime over time, especially 
after the years 2007 – 2008. This indicates that banks in the EU-27 region experienced 
a period of substantial performance deterioration, while the number of banks in the low 
capital buffer regime increases during the financial crisis. Given that the cost of raising 
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capital is high during economic downturn, our findings indicate that banks accumulate 
lower capital during the recession period. These results are of some value for managers 
and policy makers in particular as they clearly indicate that the impact of capital 
requirements is different for banks with different performance and risk-taking 
characteristics.  
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List of tables 
 
Table 1: Total regulatory capital across country and over time for EU-27 (2004 - 2013). 
Total regulatory capital across country for EU-27, (2004 - 2013).     
Country Mean Max Min Country Mean Max Min 
AUSTRIA 25.97 190 9.19 LATVIA 16.11 80.29 8.02 
BELGIUM 16.5 43.81 8.87 LITHUANIA 14.1 29.6 8.95 
BULGARIA 16.23 40.15 10.2 LUXEMBOURG 21.65 111.7 8.68 
CROATIA 17.59 38.67 9.17 MALTA 16.24 44.86 8.06 
CYPRUS 14.27 47.34 8.2 NETHERLANDS 16.48 45.9 9.3 
CZECH REPUBLIC 18.08 108.15 9.11 POLAND 13.84 33.64 8.63 
DENMARK 17.77 132.3 8.3 PORTUGAL 14.97 79.8 8.4 
ESTONIA 19.58 32.5 10.54 ROMANIA 18.41 122.63 9.77 
FINLAND 16.79 26.75 10.6 SLOVAKIA 15.31 30.38 9.05 
FRANCE 12.79 57 8.87 SLOVENIA 13.49 51.3 8.06 
GERMANY 18 95.7 8.1 SPAIN 15.88 71.9 8.17 
GREECE 13.74 36.6 8.51 SWEDEN 18.16 44.96 1.04 
HUNGARY 13.05 22.13 8.89 UNITED KINGDOM 18.07 102.9 9.7 
IRELAND 12.83 25 8.3 Mean 17.17 190 1.04 
ITALY 15.95 187 7.8     
        
   
Year Mean Max Min Year Mean Max Min 
2004 16.9 51.3 8.63 2010 18.1 187 8.1 
2005 15.2 78 8.12 2011 18.3 170 8.4 
2006 15.1 127 8.07 2012 18.3 188 8.1 
2007 15 129 7.81 2013 18.3 190 8 
2008 15 88.9 1.04 Mean 17.2 190 1 
2009 16.4 131.6 8.1         
Note: The table reports the mean total regulatory capital by country and by time over the period 2004 – 2013 for 
EU-27 countries. The total regulatory capital is calculated as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital over Risk 
Weighted Assets. 
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Table 2:  National total regulatory capital requirements 
 Minimum capital 
requirement 
Year of 
Implementation 
UK 9% 1979 
Cyprus 8% 1997 
 10% 2001 
Estonia 10% 1997 
Latvia 10% 1997 
 8% 2004 
Lithuania 10% 1997 
 8% 2005 
Note: The table shows the minimum capital requirements for countries that had set 
different minimum ratio over time. The minimum capital requirements for all other 
EU-27 countries is calculated with 8% of Risk Weighted Assets. 
 
 
Table 3: Bank capital buffer across country and over time for EU-27 (2004 - 2013). 
Bank capital buffer across country for EU-27, (2004 - 2013).     
Country Mean Max Min Country Mean Max Min 
AUSTRIA 14.59 15.7 13.12 LATVIA 11.53 16.54 4.79 
BELGIUM 15.35 17.25 13.01 LITHUANIA 11.91 16.54 7.35 
BULGARIA 11.28 17.02 8.44 LUXEMBOURG 13.82 15.22 11.5 
CROATIA 10.92 14.11 6.09 MALTA 11.3 12.91 10.4 
CYPRUS 11.03 14.43 6.23 NETHERLANDS 13.05 17.02 10.9 
CZECH REPUBLIC 12.34 14.94 9.03 POLAND 12.48 15.35 9.66 
DENMARK 11.41 16.54 7.72 PORTUGAL 14.54 17.72 9.22 
ESTONIA 12.28 14.06 8.8 ROMANIA 11.68 13.95 8.73 
FINLAND 13.4 15.88 10.53 SLOVAKIA 11.57 13.62 9.63 
FRANCE 14.45 17.53 11.18 SLOVENIA 11.07 13.24 8.81 
GERMANY 10.89 17.25 6.34 SPAIN 13.67 16.44 9.46 
GREECE 12.42 15.17 9.01 SWEDEN 10.98 15.35 6.29 
HUNGARY 12.56 14.92 8.36 UNITED KINGDOM 13.92 17.72 9.06 
IRELAND 14.01 17.53 9.82 Mean 11.75 17.72 4.61 
ITALY 11.12 17.13 4.61     
   
Year Mean Max Min Year Mean Max Min 
2004 11.8 16.23 8.77 2010 12.07 17.54 6.73 
2005 11.48 16.36 6.78 2011 11.66 17.46 7.14 
2006 11.43 16.58 6.1 2012 11.47 17.56 6.09 
2007 11.85 17.23 6.55 2013 11.8 17.72 4.79 
2008 12.01 17.26 4.61 Mean 11.75 17.72 4.61 
2009 12.08 17.46 6.23        
Note: The table reports the mean bank capital buffer by country and by time over the period 2004 – 2013 for EU-
27 countries. The bank capital buffer is calculated the natural logarithm of total regulatory capital minus minimum 
capital requirement, where total regulatory capital  is the sum of Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk Weighted Assets. 
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Table 4: Bank cost efficiency estimates across country and over time for EU-27 (2004 - 2013). 
Bank cost efficiency estimates across country for EU-27, (2004 - 2013).   
Country Mean Max Min Country Mean Max Min 
AUSTRIA 0.78 0.88 0.7 LATVIA 0.77 0.94 0.59 
BELGIUM 0.7 0.86 0.4 LITHUANIA 0.76 0.87 0.55 
BULGARIA 0.64 0.82 0.42 LUXEMBOURG 0.72 0.84 0.52 
CROATIA 0.66 0.79 0.48 MALTA 0.85 0.92 0.78 
CYPRUS 0.76 0.93 0.44 NETHERLANDS 0.73 0.86 0.5 
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.8 0.95 0.57 POLAND 0.73 0.9 0.52 
DENMARK 0.8 0.9 0.61 PORTUGAL 0.72 0.89 0.43 
ESTONIA 0.78 0.94 0.55 ROMANIA 0.63 0.78 0.46 
FINLAND 0.79 0.95 0.48 SLOVAKIA 0.78 0.86 0.57 
FRANCE 0.76 0.92 0.42 SLOVENIA 0.78 0.88 0.57 
GERMANY 0.8 0.89 0.29 SPAIN 0.84 0.97 0.43 
GREECE 0.75 0.91 0.52 SWEDEN 0.83 0.98 0.46 
HUNGARY 0.63 0.75 0.45 UNITED KINGDOM 0.79 0.96 0.47 
IRELAND 0.79 0.91 0.62 Mean 0.78 0.98 0.29 
ITALY 0.82 0.95 0.48     
Year Mean Max Min Year Mean Max Min 
2004 0.82 0.9 0.57 2010 0.81 0.95 0.47 
2005 0.84 0.98 0.44 2011 0.78 0.95 0.43 
2006 0.81 0.95 0.52 2012 0.77 0.97 0.29 
2007 0.77 0.89 0.52 2013 0.77 0.94 0.42 
2008 0.73 0.9 0.43 Mean 0.78 0.98 0.29 
2009 0.79 0.96 0.46     
Note: The table reports the mean cost efficiency by country and by time over the period 2004 – 2013 for EU-
27 countries. The bank cost efficiencies are estimated employing Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). We 
assume a common cross-country frontier for the EU-27 countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Variable definitions and data sources. 
Variables Definition Source 
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Bank-specific 
variables 
    
Buffer (BUFF) The amount of capital banks hold in excess of the 
minimum requirement and is calculated as regulatory 
capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk Weighted Assets) 
minus minimum capital requirement. 
BankScope 
Cost Efficiency 
(EFF) 
A measure of bank performance. This variable 
indicates how close a firm’s profits are to the 
benchmark of the best practice firm. The measure of 
EFF is given by the ratio of minimum cost to actual 
cost and is bounded between zero and unity. We 
employ Stochastic Frontier Analysis in order to 
estimate cost efficiency for each bank. 
SFA  
ROE Return on equity. This variable is defined as the ratio 
of net profits over equity (%). 
BankScope 
ROA Return on assets. This variable is defined as the ratio 
of net profits over total assets (%). 
BankScope 
NIM Net interest margin. This variable is defined as the ratio 
of net interest income over total assets. 
BankScope 
Non-performing 
loans (NPL) 
The ratio of non-performing loans over total loans. BankScope 
Net Loans 
(NETLOANS) 
The ratio of bank loans over total assets.  BankScope 
Off-Balance-Sheet 
items (OBS) 
Measured as the non-interest income and fee 
generating services from various contingent liabilities 
such as letters of credit, derivatives, securities 
underwriting, insurance and other types of non-
traditional banking activities. 
BankScope 
Z-Score (Z-
SCORE) 
Z-Score indicates the risk of failure for a bank and is 
measured according to the following formula: z-score 
= (1 + ROE) / Standard Deviation of ROE and 
indicates the probability of failure for a given bank. 
BankScope 
Bank size (SIZE) The natural log of total assets is used as a measure of 
bank size. 
BankScope 
Disclosure 
(DISCLSR) 
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 for listed 
banks and 0 unlisted indicating information disclosure.  
BankScope 
Commercial banks 
(COM) 
A Dummy taking the value 1 for commercial banks 
and 0 for saving banks. 
BankScope 
Country-specific 
variables 
    
GDP growth 
(GDPGR) 
GDP growth of each country. World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI) 
Concentration ratio 
(C5) 
The concentration ratio (C5) in the banking industry 
measured by the sum of the assets of the five largest 
banks as a share of all banks in each country and for 
each year. 
BankScope 
European Monetary 
Union countries 
(EMU)  
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 for European 
Monetary Union countries and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for variables.   
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BUFF 11.75 2.14 4.61 17.72 
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EFF 0.78 0.09 0.29 0.98 
ROE 4.27 21.36 -135 146 
ROA 0.39 1.70 -29.86 77.81 
NIM 2.57 1.79 -36.27 34.689 
NPL 0.06 0.8 -0.04 0.92 
NETLOANS 0.58 0.22 0.002 1.83 
OBS 0.15 0.49 -0.04 19.72 
Z-SCORE 2.49 4.44 -4.56 55.07 
SIZE 15.13 2.36 9.40 21.51 
GDPGR 0.65 3.21 -17.95 12.23 
C5 0.82 0.10 0.49 1 
Note: BUFF is the capital buffer calculated as the regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 
over Risk Weighted Assets) minus minimum capital requirement. EFF stands for 
performance measure and is derived from SFA. ROE, ROA and NIM stand for additional 
bank performance measures and are the ratios of return on equity, return on assets and net 
interest margin respectively. NPL stands for the ratio of non-performing loans over total 
loans, NETLOANS is calculated as the ratio of bank loans over total assets, OBS stands 
for the Off-Balance-Sheet items measured as the ratio of Off-Balance-Sheet items over total 
liabilities, Z-SCORE measures bank’s risk of default and SIZE is the log of total assets 
and measures the bank size. GDPGR stands for the GDP growth, while C5 stands for the 
five-firm concentration ratio of each country’s banking industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Dynamic Panel results for bank capital buffer using efficiency as performance measure 
(2004 – 2013). 
VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
      
L.BUFF 0.812*** 0.849*** 0.496*** 0.611*** 0.467*** 
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 (0.0483) (0.0389) (0.0525) (0.0512) (0.0530) 
EFF  0.633 1.023*** 0.760*** 0.831** 
  (0.388) (0.341) (0.290) (0.365) 
NPL   0.00221  0.0111*** 
   (0.00309)  (0.00410) 
Z-Score    0.0258* 0.0484** 
    (0.0135) (0.0195) 
OBS   0.0397* 0.0512** 0.0431* 
   (0.0203) (0.0218) (0.0232) 
NETLOANS   0.322 0.366** 0.521** 
   (0.204) (0.147) (0.228) 
DISCLSR   0.337** 0.120 0.256* 
   (0.165) (0.150) (0.149) 
SIZE   0.469*** 0.333*** 0.527*** 
   (0.0513) (0.0508) (0.0548) 
COM   -0.114 0.0827 -0.225* 
   (0.0753) (0.0561) (0.136) 
C5   -0.105 0.0680 -0.00117 
   (0.184) (0.160) (0.250) 
GDPGR   0.0103* 0.00430 -0.000340 
   (0.00613) (0.00751) (0.00752) 
EMU   -0.154*** -0.173*** -0.279*** 
   (0.0510) (0.0508) (0.0670) 
CONSTANT 2.172*** 1.223** -2.047*** -1.479*** -2.463*** 
 (0.522) (0.480) (0.470) (0.435) (0.559) 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
AR(2) 0.066 0.071 0.267 0.155 0.241 
Hansen test 0.052 0.065 0.304 0.281 0.191 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results. The two step GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) is used 
with Windmeijer corrected (robust) errors. We consider as exogenous the country-specific and time dummy variables 
and as endogenous the bank-specific variables. The instruments chosen for the lagged endogenous variables are two-
to-six period lags. AR(2) stands for the p-value of the second order residual autocorrelation tests. Hansen test stands 
for the p-value of Hansen’s J diagnostic test for instrument validity. The dependent variable is the capital buffer (BUFF) 
calculated as the regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk Weighted Assets) minus minimum capital requirement. 
L.BUFF is the lagged value of the dependent variable BUFF representing the dynamic nature of the model.  EFF 
stands or the cost efficiency scores calculated using SFA methodology. NPL stands for the ratio of  non-performing 
loan over total loans, Z-SCORE stands for the risk of default and is calculated as Z-Score = (1 + ROE) / Standard 
Deviation of ROE and indicates the risk of failure for a given bank,  OBS stands for the Off-Balance-Sheet items 
measured as the ratio of Off-Balance-Sheet items over total liabilities. NETLOANS stands for the bank exposure to 
loans and is calculated as the ratio of total loans over total assets, DISCLSR is a dummy taking the value 1 for listed 
banks and 0 unlisted and stands as a second measure of market discipline indicating information disclosure. SIZE is 
the log of total assets and measures the bank size while C5 stands for the five-firm concentration ratio of each country’s 
banking industry. GDPGR stands for the GDP growth, EMU is a dummy taking the value 1 for banks in Eurozone 
and 0 otherwise and COM is a dummy taking the value 1 for commercial banks and 0 for saving banks. 
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively
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Table 8: Dynamic Panel results for bank capital buffer using different performance measures (2004 – 2013). 
 VARIABLES Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
        
 L.BUFF 0.467*** 0.470*** 0.519*** 0.480*** 0.472*** 0.510*** 0.492*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0607) (0.0577) (0.0583) (0.0547) (0.0570) (0.0524) 
 EFF 0.831**    0.850** 0.929** 0.898*** 
  (0.365)    (0.355) (0.392) (0.347) 
 ROE  0.00232***   0.00217***   
  (0.000673)   (0.000635)   
 ROA   0.0262   0.0304  
   (0.0263)   (0.0272)  
 NIM    0.00806   0.0358 
    (0.0431)   (0.0287) 
 NPL 0.0111*** 0.00824** 0.00768* 0.00883* 0.0115*** 0.0108*** 0.00749* 
 (0.00410) (0.00395) (0.00410) (0.00461) (0.00370) (0.00404) (0.00384) 
 Z-Score 0.0484** 0.0367* 0.0321* 0.0532** 0.0380** 0.0336** 0.0266 
 (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0185) (0.0235) (0.0178) (0.0170) (0.0165) 
 OBS 0.0431* 0.0231 0.0275 0.0260 0.0433* 0.0446* 0.0455* 
 (0.0232) (0.0190) (0.0201) (0.0219) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0237) 
 NETLOANS 0.521** 0.484** 0.444** 0.521* 0.443** 0.465** 0.312 
 (0.228) (0.240) (0.222) (0.301) (0.210) (0.198) (0.241) 
 DISCLSR 0.256* 0.143 0.266 0.146 0.250* 0.314 0.214 
 (0.149) (0.176) (0.228) (0.194) (0.147) (0.206) (0.143) 
 SIZE 0.527*** 0.524*** 0.455*** 0.521*** 0.513*** 0.464*** 0.496*** 
 (0.0548) (0.0625) (0.0593) (0.0661) (0.0540) (0.0571) (0.0538) 
COM -0.225* -0.189 -0.133 -0.191 -0.227* -0.151 -0.225* 
 (0.136) (0.141) (0.136) (0.176) (0.120) (0.129) (0.130) 
 C5 -0.00117 -0.0467 -0.0379 0.0774 0.00818 -0.0550 0.0924 
 (0.250) (0.220) (0.222) (0.282) (0.220) (0.228) (0.201) 
 GDPGR -0.000340 0.00210 0.00541 0.00356 -0.00114 0.00223 0.00485 
 (0.00752) (0.00663) (0.00649) (0.00757) (0.00679) (0.00654) (0.00675) 
 EMU -0.279*** -0.219*** -0.155** -0.233*** -0.251*** -0.203*** -0.214*** 
 (0.0670) (0.0660) (0.0634) (0.0727) (0.0609) (0.0660) (0.0627) 
 Constant -2.463*** -1.691*** -1.252** -2.148*** -2.265*** -2.060*** -2.537*** 
 (0.559) (0.481) (0.488) (0.669) (0.509) (0.513) (0.572) 
 Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 AR(2) 0.241 0.223 0.203 0.219 0.234 0.220 0.237 
 Hansen test 0.191 0.290 0.218 0.250 0.283 0.132 0.170 
Note: The table reports the dynamic panel regression results. The two step GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) is used with Windmeijer corrected 
(robust) errors. We consider as exogenous the country-specific and time dummy variables and as endogenous the bank-specific variables. The 
instruments chosen for the lagged endogenous variables are two-to-six period lags. AR(2) stands for the p-value of the second order residual 
autocorrelation tests. Hansen test stands for the p-value of Hansen’s J diagnostic test for instrument validity. The dependent variable is the capital 
buffer (BUFF) calculated as the regulatory capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 over Risk Weighted Assets) minus minimum capital requirement. L.BUFF 
is the lagged value of the dependent variable BUFF representing the dynamic nature of the model.  EFF stands or the cost efficiency scores 
calculated using SFA methodology. ROE is the return on equity ratio, ROA the return on assets while NIM is the net interest margin. NPL stands 
for the ratio of  non-performing loans over total loans, Z-SCORE stands for the risk of default and is calculated as Z-Score = (1 + ROE) / Standard 
Deviation of ROE and indicates the risk of failure for a given bank, OBS stands for the Off-Balance-Sheet items measured as the ratio of Off-
Balance-Sheet items over total liabilities. NETLOANS stands for the bank exposure to loans and is calculated as the ratio of bank loans over total 
assets, DISCLSR is a dummy taking the value 1 for listed banks and 0 unlisted and stands as a second measure of market discipline indicating 
information disclosure. SIZE is the log of total assets and measures the bank size while C5 stands for the five-firm concentration ratio of each 
country’s banking industry. GDPGR stands for the GDP growth, EMU is a dummy taking the value 1 for banks in Eurozone and 0 otherwise and 
COM is a dummy taking the value 1 for commercial banks and 0 for saving banks.  
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
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Table 9: Results for dynamic panel threshold estimation with efficiency 
as threshold variable and buffer as dependent variable (2005 – 2013). 
EFF 0.818     
95% confidence interval (0.763 - 0.835) 
  Coefficient  S.E. 
Impact of Eff on Buffer       
λ1 0.963 *** 0.382 
λ2 -1.616 ** 0.797 
Impact of covariates       
Lag Buffer 0.761 *** 0.082 
Non-performing loans 0.004  0.004 
Z-Score 0.049 *** 0.021 
Off-Balance-Sheet items 0.012  0.015 
Net Loans 0.654 *** 0.262 
Size 0.208 *** 0.072 
C5 -0.234  0.780 
GDP growth -0.012 *** 0.005 
Time Dummies Yes   
δ  -0.842   0.836 
Observations 1735  
 
Low Regime 1033  
 
High Regime 702     
Notes:  The table reports the estimation for dynamic panel threshold model. The 
threshold value of efficiency variable for banks ranges between 0.763 - 0.835. We 
denote bank capital buffer (BUFF) as the dependent variable while as the threshold 
and the regime dependent variable we impose bank cost efficiency (EFF).  Following 
Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). In this model, 
mit, includes bank-specific and country explanatory variables. As regards the bank-
specific variables, we use: lagged capital buffer (Lag Buffer), non-performing loans, 
Z-Score, off-balance-items, net loans and size. As country variables we employ: GDP 
growth rate and concentration ratio (C5).  Finally we include time dummies. 
 ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.   
  
Table 10: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into low and high regimes based on threshold value of 
cost efficiency. 
Threshold: Efficiency                 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Low Regime 31% 32% 73% 85% 46% 43% 52% 67% 73% 
High Regime 69% 68% 27% 15% 54% 57% 48% 33% 27% 
Note: The table shows the classification of banks based on the bank efficiency threshold value that we obtained following Kremer, Bick and 
Nautz (2013). 
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Table 11: Results for dynamic panel threshold estimation with buffer 
as threshold variable and efficiency as dependent variable (2005 – 
2013). 
BUFF 13.594     
95% confidence interval (9.332 - 13.855) 
  Coefficient  S.E. 
Impact of Buffer on Eff       
λ1 0.005 * 0.003 
λ2 -0.071  0.079 
Impact of covariates       
Lag Efficiency 0.317 *** 0.042 
Non-performing loans -0.003 *** 0.001 
Z-Score -0.001  0.003 
Off-Balance-Sheet items -0.002  0.002 
Net Loans -0.055 ** 0.027 
Size -0.027 *** 0.009 
C5 0.150 * 0.077 
GDP growth 0.000  0.001 
Time Dummies Yes   
δ 0.044  *  0.025  
Observations 1735  
 
Low Regime 1273  
 
High Regime 462     
Notes:  The table reports the estimation for dynamic panel threshold model. The 
threshold value of buffer variable for banks ranges between 9.822 - 13.754. We 
denote bank efficiency (EFF) as the dependent variable while as the threshold and 
the regime dependent variable we impose the bank capital buffer (BUFF). Following 
Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). In this model, 
mit, includes bank-specific and country explanatory variables. As regards the bank-
specific variables, we use:  Lagged efficiency (Lag Efficiency), non-performing 
loans, Z-Score, off-balance-items, net loans and size. As country variables we 
employ: GDP growth rate and concentration ratio (C5).  Finally we include time 
dummies.  
 ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.   
 
Table 12: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into low and high regimes based on threshold value of 
buffer. 
Threshold: Buffer                 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Low Regime 69% 73% 79% 77% 72% 71% 74% 72% 72% 
High Regime 31% 27% 21% 23% 28% 29% 26% 28% 28% 
Note: The table shows the classification of banks based on the buffer threshold value that we obtained following Kremer, Bick and Nautz 
(2013). 
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Table 13: Results for dynamic panel threshold estimation with Z-Score as 
threshold variable and Buffer as dependent variable (2005 – 2013). 
Z-Score 0.881     
95% confidence interval (-0.679  -  0.973) 
  Coefficient  S.E. 
Impact of Z-Score on Buffer       
λ1 0.143 *** 0.031 
λ2 0.068  0.050 
Impact of covariates       
Lag Buffer 0.645 *** 0.079 
Non-performing loans 0.002  0.004 
Efficiency 0.900 *** 0.281 
Off-Balance-Sheet items 0.017  0.014 
Net Loans 0.752 *** 0.260 
Size 0.279 *** 0.071 
C5 -0.290  0.752 
GDP growth -0.011 *** 0.005 
Time Dummies    
Δ -0.047 * 0.024 
Observations 1735  
 
Low Regime 794  
 
High Regime 941     
Notes:  The table reports the estimation for dynamic panel threshold model. The threshold 
value of Z-Score variable for banks ranges between -0.679 - 0.973. We denote bank capital 
buffer (BUFF) as the dependent variable while as the threshold and the regime dependent 
variable we impose Z-Score.  Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime 
dependent intercepts (δ). In this model, mit, includes bank-specific and country explanatory 
variables. As regards the bank-specific variables, we use: lagged capital buffer (Lag Buffer), 
non-performing loans, Efficiency, off-balance-items, net loans and size. As country variables 
we employ: GDP growth rate and concentration ratio (C5).  Finally we include time dummies.  
***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.   
 
Table 14: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into low and high regimes based on threshold value of 
Z-Score. 
Threshold: Z-Score                 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Low Regime 17% 16% 21% 40% 50% 51% 48% 54% 54% 
High Regime 83% 84% 79% 60% 50% 49% 52% 46% 46% 
Note: The table shows the classification of banks based on the Z-Score threshold value that we obtained following Kremer, Bick and Nautz 
(2013). 
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Table 15: Results for dynamic panel threshold estimation with Buffer as 
threshold variable and Z-Score as dependent variable (2005 – 2013). 
BUFF 11.274     
95% confidence interval (9.183 - 13.519) 
  Coefficient  S.E. 
Impact of Buffer on  Z-Score        
λ1 -0.319 *** 0.100 
λ2 2.246 *** 1.049 
Impact of covariates       
Lag Z-Score 0.442 *** 0.078 
Non-performing loans -0.027 *** 0.006 
Efficiency 1.735 *** 0.459 
Off-Balance-Sheet items 0.000  0.011 
Net Loans -0.162  0.349 
Size 0.058  0.120 
C5 0.027  1.238 
GDP growth 0.033 *** 0.008 
Time Dummies Yes  
 
δ  -0.020   0.059 
Observations 1735  
 
Low Regime 599  
 
High Regime 1136     
Notes:  The table reports the estimation for dynamic panel threshold model. The threshold 
value of BUFF variable for banks ranges between 9.183 - 13.519. We denote Z-Score as 
the dependent variable while as the threshold and the regime dependent variable we 
impose capital buffer (BUFF).  Following Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime 
dependent intercepts (δ). In this model, mit, includes bank-specific and country 
explanatory variables. As regards the bank-specific variables, we use: lagged Z-Score 
(Lag Z-Score), non-performing loans, Efficiency, off-balance-items, net loans and size. 
As country variables we employ: GDP growth rate and concentration ratio (C5).  Finally 
we include time dummies. 
 ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
Table 16: Dynamic Threshold Analysis: classification of banks into low and high regimes based on threshold value of 
buffer. 
Threshold: Buffer                 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Low Regime 45% 52% 53% 46% 43% 42% 46% 46% 39% 
High Regime 55% 48% 47% 54% 57% 58% 54% 54% 61% 
Note: The table shows the classification of banks based on the buffer threshold value that we obtained following Kremer, Bick and Nautz 
(2013). 
 
